There are conspiracies. Many learned of Catiline, the ideal type of a conspirator, in Latin lessons. But even the memory of Richard Nixon in the Watergate affair suffices. The secret agreements by the powerful in back rooms, the hidden workings of the intelligence services, and all forms of secret diplomacy stir in us the suspicion of conspiracy.
As a general rule, we only have knowledge of failed conspiracies. And their failure, as once noted by Machiavelli in his Discorsi, is highly probable, for when more than a handful of people conspire to commit a crime, the danger posed by whistleblowers grows exponentially. Yet it does not naturally follow that conspiracies cannot succeed. We just know nothing about them. The perfect conspiracy remains just as invisible as the perfect murder.
There are not only evil but also good conspiracies. Just think of the Freemasons. None other than Jürgen Habermas demonstrated in his postdoctoral thesis about the “Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere” how intellectual conspirators institutionalized the process of enlightenment as civic public life. The Germans cling in their search for a lost identity to the conspirators of July 20, 1944, and today the well-organized activists against the “climate catastrophe” are praised worldwide. Nonetheless, the term retains a negative connotation. Or one avoids it entirely and speaks instead of conspiratorial meetings or even of “membership in a terrorist organization.”
Thus, organizing conspiracies of greater proportions seems to be quite difficult. It is much easier to set conspiracy theories in motion. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a “document” about the “Jewish world conspiracy,” which in fascist and Islamist circles is still today read with pleasure, is likely the most famous example. And as a matter of fact, one can interpret the antisemitism of National Socialism as a gigantic conspiracy theory. But whether we are dealing with Leninism, fascism, or Islamism, the project of changing or even seizing control of the world only functions when conspiracy theories succeed in seizing the masses.
In view of this, it is not surprising that “conspiracy theorist” has become a successful knockout concept. The word functions today like the word “right-wing populist”—one thereby stigmatizes dissenting opinions and silences them. They have become defamatory names for criticism, with which one pathologizes oppositional voices. Whoever fears, for example, that the state wants “because of corona” to abolish cash, make state apps obligatory, or push through Eurobonds will come to feel the full force of these knockout concepts.
In a tweet, Oliver Gorus risked the assumption that in our day conspiracy practitioners polemicize against conspiracy theorists. One could also put it this way: most critics of conspiracy theorists are themselves conspiracy theorists. That becomes apparent whenever conspiracy theories fit well into the worldview of the political and media mainstream. This becomes especially evident in the so-called “fight against the right,” into which a belated anti-fascism has styled itself with considerable media effect. Also the fact that the Americans elected Donald Trump and the British decided for Brexit, although the journalistic schoolteachers of every country had drilled the opposite into them, allows of only one explanation: Russian hackers and trolls misused the internet as a manipulation machine and confounded the minds of poor voters with fake news. And then follows: censure social media to save reason!
The alarmist critics of conspiracy theorists, who are today dominating the media, seek to create the impression that there are nutcases and fanatics on the one side, on the other the prudently and rationally decision-making politicians who follow the advice of analytical science. Here the corona crisis is a case of striking clarity. The politicians are of course rather pleased to be seen on the side of scientific rationality, for this deflects from the secrets of power. In truth, however, there are hardly more incompatible milieus than those of science and politics. Science is supposed to work analytically and to be falsifiable in its theories, that is, open for criticism and doubts. Politics, by contrast, must decide—and woe to the politicians who cast doubt upon their own decisions.
But what about the rationality of the sciences? The media-political defamation of conspiracy theorists has a palpable taboo effect. Conspiracy theories are considered today so very unscientific, indeed, anti-scientific, that most scientists are reluctant to investigate conspiracies as an issue. However, there is also likely a second reason for this: scientific theory and conspiracy theory more closely resemble one another than our enlightened self-conception would like.
When psychologists are expected to explain the attractiveness of conspiracy theories, they invariably point out that these reduce the complexity of the world, thereby offering people a quite well-arranged view of the world. That is of course correct. But this explanation overlooks the fact that a reduction of complexity in our relation to the world is unavoidable. We cannot process our sensory impressions of reality, everyday life, and the events of history in a 1:1 relation. We have to ignore most of it in order to be able to more precisely distinguish and determine some of it. And this is especially true for the scientists.
Their practice can be characterized by three questions. First, what is under the surface? The scientist does not simply accept the world as it appears. Second, what patterns can I recognize? It has to do with “pattern recognition,” that is, with the ability to see relationships in an abundance of data—not coincidentally a crucial part of any intelligence test. And third, is my theory consistent? Modern theories no longer even raise the claim of corresponding with reality but rather content themselves with immanent consistency.
The danger lurking here was dramatized by the Frankfurt School as a dialectic of enlightenment: rationality reverts to myth. And yet even when one sees the process of enlightenment less dramatically, the affinity between madness and scientific system cannot be denied. It was no one less than Theodor W. Adorno who deemed paranoia the reverse side of knowledge. We are therefore all conspiracy theorists, too.
Insofar as the scientist does not simply collect data, he forms hypotheses that gradually crystalize into theories. He then becomes altogether similar to the conspiracy theorist: under the surface of phenomena, effective forces are at work; nothing is at it seems. When it then comes to social contexts, one asks who is the mastermind—someone is behind it. And to track him down, Cicero’s question arises: “Cui bono,” who is benefitting, for whom is this useful? Apparently, it is just this question that is meant to be tabooed by means of the defamatory criticism leveled at conspiracy theorists. And whoever expresses this, must expect to be counted among them.
Translated by Daniel Steven Fisher, www.dsftranslations.com.
The new moral relativism: we are all conspiracy theorists. This is a very simplistic argument which is fallacious in its attempt to 1) assume the attribution of conspiracy is a repressive action; and 2) reduce all argument to the position of conspiracy. Reductive and dangerous in its assertions; it becomes the solipsism of the Trump error.
1. Why does Bolz mostly think conspiracies abound around government plots? Aren’t plans to kidnap a Michigan state governor and put her “on trial” a conspiracy? Or for the conspiracists, is this really nothing more than an attempt to discredit a group exercising its right to redress government?
2. What is the perfect conspiracy? Please identify one. But I guess if we know about it; it isn’t perfect. This is a good way of making a claim that can’t be refuted, since all evidence is disqualified.
3. “…one can interpret the antisemitism of National Socialism as a gigantic conspiracy theory.” This is now open to interpretation? I can only hope this is a bad translation.
4. If “conspiracy theorist” is a way of stigmatizing these days, it’s with good reason. I would say the word is used to characterize those who appear to act out a paranoia through a fantastical creation of powers threatening their lives and beliefs. Furthermore, how does the “stigma” of conspiracy silence? Certainly, even within Bolz’s assertions about the media, we see how they love giving airtime to such stories, thereby perpetuating them by publicizing them. This is far from silencing conspiracists. As for the media’s “so-called fight against the right,” which first off is difficult to believe in the age of FoxNews, if the media is belatedly anti-fascist in its criticism, I would say that’s better than being anti-democratic. Or is Bolz surprised the media would criticize those against free speech?
5. There is a difference between someone who thinks that a pedophile ring is operating out of the basement of a Washington pizza parlor; and someone who thinks Trump is trying to undermine the efficacy of the US Postal system to undermine mail-in voting. Are both conspiracies, for Bolz, probably yes. But in my view, a conspiracy needs some evidence to vindicate itself. Given, the cutbacks and services that have taken place in the US Postal system at this time, and Trumps open claims about a conspiracy, there is more than suspicion that he is trying to make his conspiracy come true. Also I think when there is irrefutable evidence put forth by Republicans and Democrats (Mueller after all was a Republican having worked in a Republican administration and the more damning Senate report was issued by a bi-partisan committee led by Republicans), Russian interference in the US elections is more than just a conspiracy theory. But all political arguments are reduced to conspiracies in Bolz’s theory.
7. Never would have considered Eurobonds a conspiracy. Not exactly a secret being pushed by a cabal. By the way, for those who haven’t heard, cash was becoming obsolete way before COVID-19; and it was retailers, not central banks. On one thing I plead ignorance: what is an obligatory state app?
9. I don’t know of any psychologists who think conspiracists create a simplified world to explain their fears: on the contrary, the arrangements and connections are so bizarre they have to complicated to explain away all the things that make no sense.
10. As for comparing the scientific knowledge with conspiratorial knowledge, Bolz appears to have forgotten the scientific method. Whatever happened to testing the theory?
For those who question conspiracy theories: all we ask for is some element of proof; evidence to investigate. There is a reason why no one is exploring Hunter Biden’s emails. There is nothing there at best; and possibly a Russian set up at worst. You can say US intelligence sources may be acting on their own conspiracy theories, but with good reason. In short, Bolz makes no distinction between unfounded conspiracies and those founded on suspicion of past practices. What’s funny about this essay is that Bolz thinks conspiracy theorists understand the world through simple reductions of its political and social relations. But here he tries to retrieve the stigmata of the conspiracists by arguing for the scientist as conspiracist. This is reductio ad absurdum.
If Bolz wants to say: we are all conspiracy theorists, then all knowledge is suspicious. But let’s call this essay out for what it really is: an attempt to defend right wing criticism disguised as a meta-critique. Rather than making a case that there might be an element of truth in the conspiracist which is being ignored, Bolz tries to question the validity of the critics themselves along the same lines they criticize the conspiracists. But it doesn’t hold up. To paraphrase an iconic conspiracist: trust, but verify.
Volpaccio’s credulity is a thing of wonder. Bolz’s critical intelligence remains appreciated.
Florindo:
I think the last time we communicated was many decades ago over an intense discussion about the strategy and tactics being deployed by individual participants in the then relatively new T.V. series Big Brother!
What is your quick sketch of the contemporary structure of power in the U.S. Does it have any Big Brother elements to it, in your opinion?
Florinda:
Ops, I think I remembered the wrong T.V. show, it was Survivor participant strategy we were debating not strategy on Big Brother.
That hurts the symmetry of my argument–but would still be interested in your perspective.
Mr Miller: As someone who doesn’t believe in the number of deaths being reported, two of whom were my relatives, and that George Floyd’s death was from a fetanyl overdose, I think you are an excellent example of the problem with conspiracy theorists: a priori paranoia. By the way, if you’re going to drink the kool-aid, you might consider spiking it with LSD, it could help expand your mind.
Mr. Kulk: Regarding the contemporary structure of power. Pardon my saying so, but it sounds like you’re looking for a conspiracy too. For me talking about power is like talking about taxes, its a means, not an end. I am more concerned about structures of inequality and injustice; and in a liberal democratic society that involves a critique of — to use a dated but I think still relevant concept — false consciousness. I understand you are concerned about the totally administered state, but what we may be really confronting is the totally administered civil society; and here I mean the marketplace not social media because the later is simply another process of commodification. But this is not a conspiracy, its a systemic problem. As another conspiracist once said: follow the money.
I really enjoy following the money but in more inclusive sense then you seem to assume.
You should start paying more attention to real, empirical entities existing outside our three traditional branches of Government, like our Federal Reserve system and our private banking system and begin to dig into how they actually function and the powers they have. (No conspiracy here, just getting into the more granular details of already long existing institutional operations).
For example, the day to day operational details of creating and allocating money are rarely discussed in frameworks of organizational power, in fact I don’t believe there is much scholarly literature on which regulations precisely allow banks to create money and how it is accomplished, since such details are not explicitly stated in any law, statute, regulation, or court-ruling.
You may find that the structures of inequality your are rightly concerned about are intimately linked to the largely unexamined processes of the creation and allocation of money and credit.
Do, indeed, follow the money but not in a superficial manner. You may find yourself looking at the apparatus of power in a new way.
.
Ah yes – government: whether in the US or anywhere else, working only for the common person’s benefits, with full transparency, and liberty and justice for all (just like the media and big corporations!)… Government itself is a conspiracy, on a certain fundamental level, as is all that surrounds it, especially when it’s fuel is ignorance, division, and money. Fun to watch, though. Cheers!
Mr. Kulk: I am not sure what exactly constitutes an “empirical entity” and why the Fed is one and not the other branches of government. By the way, the Fed doesn’t exist “outside” the other branches of government. Its independence doesn’t make it outside of government; it remains answerable to the executive branch and congressional branches legislatively through appointments and policies. Trump’s threat to replace the head of the Fed every time he disagrees with their policy is only restrained by the fact that it is a nuclear option. As I may have said, the Fed’s power lies more in directing markets by its policies and being a buyer of last resort for credit; where Congress and the Executive branch may be the buyer of last resort for equity and hybrid instruments when it comes to bailouts. For example, you may be familiar with the Fed Funds rate, which is currently at 0; it is not a real rate but a target rate set for interbank borrowings that influences liquidity in the credit markets By the way, I beg to differ on your statement that there isn’t much study on banks, etc. If the financial crisis produced anything, it was certainly this. Dodd-Frank and the Consumer Protection Bureau are certainly responses to the social dangers posed by the actions of the financial markets, though perhaps not as seriously as you would like. By the way, let’s be precise here, banks do not create money. Their ability to lend money is regulated by reserve requirements set by the Fed and various policies. All of this is studied very seriously. If you really want to follow the money, I would advise subscribing to a Bloomberg and its Terminal; expensive for sure, but information that you can’t get elsewhere and through a deep dive can unravel any conspiracy.
Florindo:
I disagree with so much of what you just said above. But for now lets just take one example of your mistaken economic assumptions–you description of how bank money is created. I would maintain that you are relying on an incorrect theory of banking when you say:
“their ability to lend money is regulated by reserve requirements set by the Fed and various policies.”
I would argue instead that Central Bank reserve requirements are never used for creating bank money–this only happens in undergraduate text books like the iconic Samuelson Introductory Economics text. Samuelson based his description on what I and many others would argue is an incorrect representation of bank procedures.
A particular bank’s reserves at our Federal Reserve are not lent out. They always stay on the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve–so its not as if the particular bank can take this money and give you a loan.
When banks lend, they create money and credit out of nothing(which you can clearly trace through a particular banks accounting procedures) and they don’t need reserves for that because they don’t lend reserves. This disbursement of money from the lender to borrower takes place in the act of making bank loan funds available to the bank borrower.
This argument comes from what is called the credit creation theory of banking which maintains that each bank is said to create credit and money out of nothing whenever it executes bank loan contracts or purchases assets. So banks do not need to first gather deposits or reserves to lend.
If you are interested, I would be glad to go into more detailed accounting procedures which actually take place in the act of creating money and credit out of the bank lending process.
Mr. Kulik, Banks lend money against their deposits and checking liabilities. Reserve requirements set by the Fed determines how much they need to hold back as cushion against the likelihood of default. Capital requirements also set by the Fed establish a minimum liquidity the bank needs to maintain vis a vis the riskiness of their assets. They do not create “credit out of nothing.”
The Fed provides the market with liquidity by trading in the overnight repo rate, commercial paper and bond market. During moments of illiquidity, it may decide to use its balance sheet to purchase various short term and long term financial instruments to keep the market liquid; thereby introducing more money into they economy. Here it is arguable whether the Fed is printing money, but at the end of the day, it’s in one sense borrowing against the US economy, which at the same time it is trying to regulate and in dire moments, save. In other words, it will buy up credit instruments the market may decide not to purchase because no one wants to take on risk, no matter how credit worthy. (What saved the Euro was the European Central Bank buying up all the Greek bonds.) Some of these may be perfectly good credits under normal circumstances; but what is a good credit when no one wants to purchase it? This is what I mean when I say the Fed is the buyer of last resort. By the way, the Fed can lend money to banks through the discount window; but this is usually not something encouraged. Banks borrow from each other if need to with the Fed Funds rate, which is a target rate set by the Fed for banks to borrow against each other’s excess reserve requirements.
Granted, this simplifies the story, but how much of bank liabilities are recirculated into the economy through credit depends on how much risk a bank decides to take with the cash they are borrowing from their depositors and their own balance sheet.
I think what the Great Recession exposed is the way banks have circumvented the rules established by the Federal Reserve and other agencies of government such as Comptroller of the Currency and Treasury to surreptitiously increase their leverage while under-evaluating risk. Its about leverage and risk; and leverage does not happen out of nothing. If banks were able to create money out of nothing when lending, then there is nothing to lose through a default. Isn’t that the logical implication?
Regarding risk, all else aside, here is where historically banks have disguised their racial and class discrimination; e.g. redlining. At the same time, it is possible for Donald Trump to be able to borrow from the private bank division of Deutsche Bank to pay off loans with the institutional and commercial division of the same bank while he is suing the bank after having defaulted; and all this after having previously declared bankruptcy eight times. It appears to me the wrong questions are being asked.