In today’s episode of the Telos Press Podcast, David Pan talks with Beau Mullen about his article “Turmoil in Egypt: Faith, Nationalism, and the Apparent Inadequacies of Liberalism,” from Telos 194 (Spring 2021). An excerpt of the article appears below.
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Turmoil in Egypt: Faith, Nationalism, and the Apparent Inadequacies of Liberalism
Beau Mullen
This paper will analyze the fundamental importance of religion in contemporary Egyptian politics, as illustrated by the conflict between liberalism and Islamism leading up to the nation’s first election and the protests in the year following the election of the Islamist Mohammed Morsi that led to the overthrow of the regime. Also to be analyzed is the authoritarian regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, which was initially thought by many to be the rescuer of liberalism but which has proven to be extraordinarily repressive to both members of the Muslim Brotherhood and liberals alike, while simultaneously claiming to offer governance informed by Islam. The integral position occupied by religion in Egypt’s politics shows the apparent rejection of secular liberalism in favor of government based upon a combination of nationalism and shared religious beliefs, with conflict arising primarily around the extent to which policy decisions should be informed by such concerns. My intent is to use the turmoil in Egypt as a cautionary tale for the post-liberal era of politics. The paper will heavily reference David D. Kirkpatrick’s Into the Hands of the Soldiers, reporting on events in Egypt, and Carl Schmitt’s writings on the shortcomings of liberalism.
Toward the close of Anne Applebaum’s October 2018 Atlantic article exploring the rise and machinations of illiberal states in Europe, she offers this apt explanation of the appeal of the illiberal regime: “the principles of competition, even when they encourage talent and create upward mobility, don’t necessarily answer deeper questions about national identity, or satisfy the human desire to belong to a moral community.”[1] These questions and desires, of course, are not limited to the citizenry of Europe, and this realization can help make sense of the conundrum that has been Egyptian politics for the past several years. Egypt’s regime changes have occurred rapidly and, more often than not, have perplexed and surprised Western observers. To briefly summarize: Mubarak’s regime was removed during the so-called Arab Spring, a military council ruled until elections could be held, elections were held, and Mohammed Morsi, the candidate associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected by a slim majority. By most accounts Morsi was not an effective leader, and there was significant tension between Morsi’s Islamists and the more liberal elements of Egyptian society, culminating in massive protests and a military coup, ostensibly to avoid civil war. Following another, far more brutal period of military rule that included the harshest suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood in generations, highly suspect elections were held in which Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the leader of the military regime, was elected president, and he remains in that position at the time of writing.
There appears to be a misconception, particularly in the United States, that the primary struggle leading up to the coup that brought Sisi to power was between the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, which desired a strict, theocratic rule based upon Sharia law, and secularist liberals who wanted a Western-style democratic republic devoid of religious influence. This simply was not the case. First, it is not entirely clear that Morsi intended to bring about an Islamist theocracy rather than rule as an Islamist leader elected by a predominantly Muslim populace. Most importantly for the purposes of this essay, the majority of the liberal contingent were not necessarily secular. As David D. Kirkpatrick, a New York Times correspondent reporting from Egypt at the time, writes: “Even the most ardent anti-Islamist so often turned out to be fervently religious (albeit in different ways), and even the most secular Egyptians spoke and acted in ways that struck Americans as pious. Never trust anyone who tries to generalize about ‘the Egyptian people’ and their religion, especially anyone who tells you that ‘the people’ either chose or rejected political Islam.”[2] While this observation is certainly apt, in particular regarding political Islam, it should also be noted that religion, in particular Islam or another creed’s relationship to it, is central to most, if not all, politics and law in modern Egypt. For instance, the canonical law of parties engaged in familial and inheritance disputes is what is referenced to settle such disputes. Islam is the official religion of Egypt in the constitutions of 1971, 2012, and 2014, and even a cursory look at the latter two illustrates the degree of deference that the government established by the respective constitution is (ostensibly at least) prepared to allow to Islamic beliefs.
1. Anne Applebaum, “A Warning from Europe: The Worst Is Yet to Come,” Atlantic, October 2018.
2. David D. Kirkpatrick, Into the Hands of the Soldiers: Freedom and Chaos in Egypt and the Middle East (New York: Viking, 2018), p. 246.
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