The Significance of the Sudanese Revolution

The ongoing Sudanese revolution has emerged at a time when most of us had already given up any realistic hope for what has become known as the Arab Spring. Yet, if anything, the revolutionaries in Sudan have the best chance yet of simultaneously defeating both nationalist dictatorship and religious fundamentalism. This would be no small feat; it would arguably mark the most significant historical turning point in the struggle for democracy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since World War II.

Since the protests began in Tunisia in late 2010, the Arab Spring has repeatedly failed to deliver on its promise of democratic governance. I argue that this is primarily because the protest movements have simply not been revolutionary enough to break free from the dominating orbit of the retroactive forces of nationalist dictatorships and religious fundamentalism. Under these circumstances, the non-violent, mostly liberal movements were quickly neutralized, demonstrating the degree to which the death of the Left has left contemporary societies at the mercy of fascist forces.

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When It Comes to War with Iran: Less Is Not More

The decades-long conflict between the United States and Iran seems to be headed toward escalation. The American announcement that aircraft carriers and B-52 bombers have been deployed, along with reports of plans to post 120,000 troops to the Middle East, has put the region on high alert. Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s statement that Iran will no longer abide by all of the terms of the 2015 nuclear agreement (JPOAC) that it signed with the United States and five other world powers signals that the crippling sanctions have forced the Iranians’ hand. Indeed, Iran has issued an ultimatum that without economic progress in 60 days, it will cease adhering to the limits of enrichment. This move would arguably bring Iran closer to nuclear capability. Iran’s message, however, should not come as a surprise. The strict limits of the nuclear agreement were only agreed to in exchange for economic relief, which came to a halt through the United States’ imposition of various new punitive sanctions on Iran. Additionally, the special purpose entity Instex (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges), set up by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to assist Iran in legally bypassing U.S. trade sanctions, has not yet had the desired impact. Despite the willingness of European nations to facilitate non-dollar trade with Iran, the U.S. sanctions have succeeded in choking off the Iranian economy. This effective assault on the Iranian economy has taken away the clearest incentive for Iran to continue to fully comply with the nuclear agreement and has increased the chances of military confrontation.

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The Nuclear Deal Crumbles

Matthias Küntzel’s Germany and Iran: From the Aryan Axis to the Nuclear Threshold, published by Telos Press Publishing, presents an extensive and detailed historical account of German–Iranian relations from the early twentieth century to the present. Save 20% on your purchase of Küntzel’s Germany and Iran in our online store by using the coupon code BOOKS20 during checkout. The following essay has been translated from the German by Matthew J. Cooper.

As late as May 7, 2019, France sent a message to Iran’s rulers: “We do not want Tehran to announce tomorrow actions that would violate the nuclear agreement, because in this case we Europeans would be obliged to reimpose sanctions as per the terms of the agreement.”

The admonition was futile. On the following day, exactly one year since the United States withdrew from the nuclear agreement, Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani made two things public: He announced that effective immediately the regime no longer felt bound by the central provisions of the nuclear agreement. For example, by section 7, which requires the regime to limit its inventory of low-enriched uranium to 300 kg. Also affected is section 10, according to which Iran may not manufacture or store more than 130 tons of heavy water for fifteen years. Iran will not adhere to this provision either, according to Rouhani. Heavy water is used for reactors that are specially adapted for the production of weapons-grade plutonium. These quantitative restrictions on materials needed for nuclear weapons belong to the core of the agreement that Tehran is now avowedly violating.

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Matthias Küntzel on Berlin’s Split with Washington on Iran

Writing at the American Interest, Matthias Küntzel analyzes the divide between the United States and Germany regarding Donald Trump’s decision last year to withdraw the U.S. from the nuclear deal with Iran. In his book Germany and Iran: From the Aryan Axis to the Nuclear Threshold, published by Telos Press Publishing, Küntzel presents an extensive and detailed historical account of German-Iranian relations from the early twentieth century to the present, which provides essential context for understanding this split. Save 20% on your purchase of Küntzel’s Germany and Iran in our online store by using the coupon code BOOKS20 during checkout.

An excerpt from Küntzel’s recent essay:

Trump’s decision is not without risk. Given the nature of the Iranian regime, irrational responses and war scenarios can’t be ruled out. Exactly one year after the United States left the deal, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announced a partial withdrawal, saying Iran would keep excess enriched uranium and heavy water instead of selling it. Continuing the policy of nuclear blackmail, he threatens to resume higher uranium enrichment after 60 days. However, at least for the time being, Tehran seems not to be interested in a massive escalation.

Trump’s alternative approach—to put sufficient economic and political pressure on the Iranian leadership to compel it to sign a new agreement that would address not only Iran’s nuclear ambitions but also its missile program and regional warmongering—may be a long shot, but it is worth trying. Effective sanctions, however, require the cooperation of Iran’s most important trade partners, Germany and the European Union. And that is where the problem starts.

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Goodbye “Welcome Culture”? Part II

The summer of 2015 may prove to have been a decisive moment in European and global history. The dramatic arrival of hundreds of thousands of people during a relatively short period of time, traveling via the Balkans and Hungary and toward Austria, Germany, Sweden, and other high-income European countries, will be forever remembered by those who witnessed these events as they unfolded. The swift arrival of 1.3 million asylum seekers, predominantly young men from the hotspots of global conflicts, like Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, took the political systems of several European countries, and the European Union itself, by surprise.

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Goodbye “Welcome Culture”? Part I

The following think-piece by an active participant in the European public discussion on immigration policy, written well before the European parliamentary elections of May 29, 2019, is understood as a contribution to the European and international political debate and not (so much) as a “pure” scholarly article. It begins with a stark prognosis: the earthquake-like outcome of these elections will strengthen the far-right political parties all over Europe, dramatically weakening the European center and left, and breaking down the “welcome culture” initiated by German chancellor Angela Merkel’s famous statement of late summer 2015—”We can do this” (“Wir schaffen das”)—which signaled a temporary and short-lived “air superiority” for multiculturalism, cultural pluralism, and the welcoming of masses of refugees from the Middle East and North. One of the main reasons for the predictable decline of the Left on the European continent is, in my opinion, its inability to find credible solutions to the problems of immigration and integration.

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