The Telos Student Seminars provide a forum for students around the world to engage with critical theory by discussing a common set of paired texts from Telos—one current essay and one pertinent essay from our archives. In our second cycle of seminars, we are discussing Huimin Jin’s “Cultural Self-Confidence and Constellated Community: An Extended Discussion of Some Speeches by Xi Jinping” (Telos 195, Summer 2021) and an excerpt from Cornelius Castoriadis’s “The Crisis of Western Societies” (Telos 53, Fall 1982). The following report is from the Telos Student Seminars group in Haifa, Israel. For more details about the Telos Student Seminars, including summaries of the two essays under discussion, click here.
From Haifa, Israel
Abandoning Philosophy for Politics? Castoriadis, Jin, and Zeno’s Arrow
Participants: Peli Meir (PhD student), Dr. Lilach Ben-Zvi, Ayal Yechezkel (PhD student), Eyal Kanfi (PhD student)
In our seminar conversation, the group focused on a single question that stems from integrating the two articles by Cornelius Castoriadis and Huimin Jin: does intercultural dialogue require not intervening in other cultures, thus abandoning universal values that the two cultures perceive as moral red lines? The question arose when Jin’s suggestion in his article, which advocates for a Chinese–Western dialogue that strengthens both cultures through learning from one another, is challenged by a reality in which states act atrociously in the name of their culture. Additionally, an intercultural dialogue is conducted in the existing Chinese–Western relations, but only when it comes to matters that are already in agreement. The dialogue usually becomes difficult only when values that are deemed sacred or universal are introduced (e.g., the Western objection to media censoring or human rights violations in Xinjiang, which Western societies object to due to the individualism Castoriadis describes). The question becomes, then, what exactly does Jin suggest in his idea for a dialogue? Are we to ignore violations of values we deem universal in the name of dialogue? How are we to interpret the very term “dialogue,” which is so crucial to this endeavor?
The participants then took a step back and conversed on the problem arising in the very discussion that stems from Jin’s article, namely, the problem of particularity and universality. Bridging these two terms seems inconceivable, and it looks as if that is exactly what Jin attempts in his article. This attempt goes as follows: The Chinese and Western cultures have a diplomatic problem due to their cultural differences. Jin’s solution is to present a theoretical foundation to permit an intercultural dialogue that involves acknowledging the other culture without changing it. Introducing this theoretical foundation seems to bring to the fore a new universal in the name of particularity; after all, the definition of a universal must include an element of singularity, i.e., a value above all others that must not be transcended. In the case of Jin’s article, this universal seems to be the dialogue itself, since it demands of every side to avoid abandoning the conversation for other values they deem sacred. Therefore, Jin’s suggestion seems to have an internal tension: it is a universal of particularities. Meaning, any values that are deemed universal in these cultures, and are incompatible with the other’s, must be ignored in the name of the dialogue. The problem with this is not only the internal tension but that Jin seems to suggest this dialogue as an alternative to the Western hegemony of liberalism, as he claims that liberalism is too confrontational for dialogue due to its claim to universality. To be sure, the critique of Western universalism is legitimate, but it seems dubious to suggest another universality in its place.
This claim to universal particularity (a universal value in which particulars keep to themselves) is exactly what ruined the intersubjective dialogue in the West in the article by Castoriadis, one participant claimed. In Western individualism, the intersubjective dialogue between individuals is lost due to their avoidance of discussing difficult subjects for the sake of individualism. This theoretical impasse concerning particularity and universality seems insurmountable.
The issue resolves itself, one participant claimed, not in theory but in factual reality alone. Hamas and Israel are foes, but they still conduct a dialogue even after all the wars and calamities between them. The theoretical tension between particularity and universality is like one of Zeno’s paradoxes: if we look at the flight of an arrow toward its target theoretically, it is mathematically impossible for this movement to occur. This is because between every two points at the axis of its linear voyage extend an infinity of numbers, meaning the arrow would need to pass infinity several times before hitting its target—a mathematical impossibility. Yet the arrow reaches its target in reality.
What does this paradox have to do with the intercultural dialogue between China and the West? The paradox is relevant in that even though it is theoretically impossible, bridging China’s and the West’s universalities and particularities occurs in reality. Meaning, the question in bettering Chinese–Western relations should not be about finding a theoretical foundation for them. Rather, it should revolve around the question of action: asking what we should do rather than what we should theorize. Notwithstanding the theoretical impossibility in particularity and universality theoretically, bridging between cultures is indeed possible in action. In other words, since there are some values that are deemed universal or sacred in both cultures, but are incompatible with one another (harmony for China, rights for the West), the bridging of the two powers cannot be done in theory. It can only be done in action, as Xi Jinping’s speech suggesting bilateral cooperation in Jin’s article, or Jin’s article itself bringing this good will to the fore in the face of Western prejudices.
This seminar conversation revealed more questions than answers: What is the role of political philosophy in bridging between cultures? Does it have a role in politics at all? Should we abandon philosophy for politics, as Hannah Arendt suggested? And how do we live with the internal dialogue among ourselves and the external one with others? One participant suggested that these fundamental questions arise because of our exposure to another culture, which unsettles our theoretical presumptions while putting them to the test. Or rather, another participant wondered, does our perplexity at Jin’s idea stem from the crisis described in Castoriadis’s essay, in which the individual in Western societies “no longer wants social relations, in which he feels trapped, and which he reproduces only insofar as he cannot do otherwise”?
